



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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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15 June 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK USSR-China: The continuing Sino-Soviet polemic over the proper tactics to be pursued toward the United States has brought forth from the Soviet side the most sweeping and explicit condemnation to date of Chinese internal and foreign policies. Pravda's strongly worded affirmation of Khrushchev's pre-summit policies on 12 and 13 June will make it clear to the Chinese leaders that they must now choose between increasing condemnation from Moscow and adjustment to Soviet positions. Publication of these authoritative statements is the best recent evidence that Khrushchev is firmly in control in Moscow and serves notice to any critics at home or in the satellites that support for the more aggressive Chinese line will not be tolerated.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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25X1 [redacted] Cambodia: A high Cambodian official has hinted that his government might accept North Vietnamese diplomatic representation as a result of its disputes with South Vietnam, in particular those over several small islands in the Gulf of Siam. A semi-official Phnom Penh newspaper states that Saigon's latest note on this matter clearly reveals its "policy of expansion" and warns of the "incalculable consequences" of any attack on Cambodian soil. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Pakistan-India: Negotiations on the division of waters in the Indus River basin appear to have hit a last-minute snag. Pakistani and Indian representatives cannot agree on how much water India is to supply Pakistan while diversionary canals are being built. It now seems unlikely that the long-awaited treaty will be signed in late June as had been hoped; both sides, however, continue to regard a settlement as essential to their development plans, and a solution will probably be reached. [redacted]

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15 June 60

DAILY BRIEF

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Pravda Counters Peiping's Criticisms

Pravda's strongly worded reaffirmations of Khrushchev's policies of "peaceful coexistence," summit meetings, and tactical compromises with the West, published on 12 and 13 June, are sharp, if oblique, attacks on Chinese foreign and internal policies. The 12 June article, ostensibly a review of Lenin's book "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" on the 40th anniversary of its publication, is the most sweeping condemnation to date of "leftist secretarians"--in context a thinly veiled epithet for the Chinese leadership. The 13 June editorial, addressing itself to Moscow's disarmament proposals, rebuts Peiping's reservations on this question by reiterating as the basis of Soviet foreign policy Khrushchev's formulation that war is no longer inevitable and asserting that only shortsighted people who have lost all sense of reality can fail to believe in the possibility of realizing total disarmament.

The articles seem designed to dispel any idea that the U-2 incident and the summit collapse might necessitate a reassessment of the premises of Khrushchev's pre-summit policy. Khrushchev's speeches after the summit breakup appeared to be defensive statements designed to demonstrate the consistency of his policy while anticipating and deflecting further criticism. The Chinese, after a brief period in which they pointed out that they had been right all along in their assessment of US intentions, renewed the attack in People's Daily and in virulent speeches at the recently concluded WFTU meetings in Peiping.

The present articles are a continuation of the discussion which began in April when presidium member Kuusinen, in his speech on the anniversary of Lenin's birth, replied to the criticism of Soviet ideological positions contained in two April editions of Red Flag, the Chinese theoretical journal. The differences of opinion are much more explicitly stated now, however, and the strong reaffirmation of Khrushchev's policies will make it clear to the Chinese

leaders that they must now choose between increasing condemnation from Moscow and adjustment to the Soviet position.

Publication of these authoritative statements fully supporting Khrushchev's policies is the best recent evidence that he is firmly in control in Moscow. The articles themselves were probably intended as an implicit warning to any critics at home and in the satellites that support for the more aggressive Chinese line will not be tolerated.

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Cambodia May Be Considering New Gestures Toward North Vietnam

(The Foreign Ministry secretary general has hinted to an American official that Cambodia might accept North Vietnamese diplomatic representation as a result of its bitter disputes with South Vietnam. Cambodia regards South Vietnam with extreme suspicion and believes the Diem government has "insatiable territorial ambitions," which now are centered on several small islands in the Gulf of Siam. The American Embassy in Phnom Penh believes South Vietnam's persistence in pressing its territorial claims is likely to put further strain on US-Cambodian relations, as Phnom Penh feels the United States has long supported the Diem government in its anti-Cambodian activities.

(Sihanouk is reported to be in a depressed and troubled mood, "intensely displeased" with his neighbors--South Vietnam and Thailand--as well as the major Western powers. In such a mood he might be inclined to strike out at his "imperialist" enemies by accepting political representatives from North Vietnam.

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Pakistani-Indian Negotiations Reach Last-Minute Impasse

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Pakistani-Indian negotiations on the division of waters in the Indus Basin appear to have hit a last-minute snag. According to Pakistani President Ayub, the two countries' representatives have failed to agree on how much water India is to supply Pakistan while the necessary new diversionary canals are being built. Indian officials have complained that Pakistan has raised its original demands. Ayub, on the other hand, told Ambassador Rountree on 11 June that Pakistan is willing to submit the question for arbitration by the World Bank but that India refuses.

The Indus waters dispute and Kashmir are the two most important disputes between Pakistan and India. Both governments have worked for a waters agreement, regarding it as the top-priority target in their efforts over the past year and a half to improve relations. Nehru has been planning to visit Ayub in Rawalpindi to sign the treaty.

Pakistani-Indian relations would probably become seriously strained again if a real deadlock should develop in the final stages of the Indus negotiations. However, while it now seems unlikely that the long-awaited treaty will be signed in late June as had been hoped, a solution will probably be worked out eventually.

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